Research

Development economics and urban and regional economics, with political economy and public economics. Applied empirical work on Indonesian microdata.

Research interests

Primary fields

Development Economics

Shocks, informal insurance, and household responses where formal insurance and state capacity are weak.

Urban and Regional Economics

Where people build and where activity locates: settlement in hazard-prone land, rebuilding after disasters, and how new transport links change villages’ access to markets.

Secondary fields

Political Economy

Local order, collective action, and the institutions that govern public resources, including public procurement.

Public Economics

How public money is actually spent. Government procurement, competition and bidding for public contracts, and the distance between what a rule requires and what an official can do.

Methods

Causal inference on long administrative panels, and the measurement problems that come with changing administrative boundaries.

Difference-in-Differences Instrumental Variables Regression Discontinuity Design Spatial Econometrics Geospatial Data Analysis Satellite & Remote Sensing Data Administrative & Survey Microdata

Map of Indonesia. Villages first exposed to damage-level shaking are coloured by survey wave and scattered across the archipelago; stars mark the epicentre of the main earthquake behind each cohort.

Damage-level earthquake exposure is staggered across two decades and scattered across the archipelago, not concentrated in a single disaster. Villages are coloured by the survey wave in which they were first exposed to MMI ≥ VI; stars mark the epicentre of the main earthquake behind each cohort.

Working papers

Earthquakes and Conflict: Evidence from Indonesia’s Seismic Zones

with M. Halley Yudhistira and Jahen F. Rezki  ·  Working paper  ·  JEL: D74, K42, Q54, O12, O18, R12

Does a strong earthquake raise communal conflict or suppress it? The empirical record disagrees even on the sign. We combine seven waves of Indonesia’s village census (PODES, 2005–2024) with USGS ShakeMap ground-shaking intensities for the 43,351 villages in the country’s official medium and high seismic-hazard zones, dating each village’s first exposure to Modified Mercalli Intensity VI or above, where ordinary masonry buildings begin to crack. First exposure lowers the probability that a village reports a mass brawl by 1.73 percentage points against a 6.7 percent pre-exposure mean, a decline of 26 percent.

A fall in reported violence is not self-interpreting. It is equally consistent with less fighting, with a village head too busy to file a report, and with a general improvement in local order under the eye of arriving responders. No single outcome separates those readings, and the disaster-conflict literature has been asking the question with one outcome at a time. The same form, filed by the same village head over the same twelve-month recall window, also records theft, robbery, and assault, and those acts differ in what they demand of whoever commits them: communal violence needs coordination and confrontation together, robbery an encounter but no coordination, theft neither. Holding reporter, instrument, and window fixed turns that variation into an identification device.

On a single common sample of 300,018 village-waves, communal conflict falls by 1.7 percentage points against a 2.6 percent base while theft does not follow it down. Equality of the two responses is rejected on both scales (p = 0.003 linear, p < 0.001 proportional), and robbery and assault do not follow theft. Taken to the earthquake, the unit at which treatment is actually assigned, the divergence is 7.6 percentage points weighting shocks by the villages they treat and 6.3 points counting each shock once (p = 0.023), positive in 12 of the 19 usable earthquakes.

We are deliberate about which half of that contrast carries the weight. It is the communal decline, not theft’s level. Theft rises sharply under wave effects, but its own coefficient is not separately identified once province-by-wave effects are imposed, and nothing in the argument requires theft to have risen. What the data establish is that the two series part company, and that they part company because collective violence falls while acquisitive crime does not.

That pattern discriminates. A uniform reporting shock moves all four acts together, a general collapse of local order raises all four, and a rise in the motive for predation raises theft and robbery together. What we observe is most consistent with a loss of the organisational capacity that collective violence requires and stealth theft does not. A pre-determined moderator points the same way: the decline concentrates in villages that had mobile-phone signal at the 2005 baseline, an interaction worth 2.1 percentage points. High-involvement public-purpose gotong royong falls by 3.1 to 3.2 percentage points after exposure, while emergency mutual aid, which needs no standing coordination, does not.

Two panels. Panel A, a coefficient plot on five outcomes: theft sits above zero, communal conflict, robbery and warga sit below it, assault sits on it. Panel B, a scatter of the theft-minus-warga divergence for each of nineteen earthquakes, most of them positive, with both pooled means and the bootstrap band above zero.

The composition of disorder. Panel A plots the treatment effect on each of five outcomes, estimated on the single common sample of 300,018 village-waves with village and wave fixed effects and 95 percent village-clustered intervals. Communal conflict, robbery, and the civilian-versus-civilian warga series sit below zero, theft sits above it, and assault sits on it. Warga is the subtype whose survey wording is near-stable across all seven waves. Panel B re-estimates the theft-minus-warga divergence separately for each of the 19 usable earthquakes, sorted by magnitude, with marker area proportional to the villages a shock treats. The divergence holds when the earthquake, rather than the village, is the unit of inference.

Work in progress

Faith after the Shock: Earthquakes, Religious Expenditure, and the Insurance Value of Religion in Indonesia

Billy Tulungen  ·  In progress

Does religion function as informal insurance against uninsured risk? The existing evidence rests largely on stated religiosity measured at district level or on aggregate shocks. This project instead observes what households actually pay: religious and ceremonial expenditure in rupiah, drawn from the consumption module used for Indonesia’s official poverty statistics, matched to village-level earthquake exposure on constant 2005 boundaries. The design separates three channels with opposing predictions — the income effect, the club-good or mutual-insurance channel, and the coping channel — using a within-block placebo that isolates the income effect and a continuous exposure measure built from exact event timestamps against the survey’s twelve-month recall window.

Lines Drawn after the Ground Moved: Post-Disaster No-Build Zones and Reconstruction in Palu, Indonesia

Billy Tulungen  ·  In progress  ·  JEL: Q54, R14, R52, O18

Can a government keep people out of places a disaster has shown to be unsafe? After the 2018 Palu earthquake, liquefaction, and tsunami, Indonesia announced zones where all rebuilding was banned and a surrounding tier where housing was banned. I digitize the official zone map, build a grid of 75-metre pixels over 197 villages, and measure buildings in every pixel and year from 2016 to 2023 with Google’s Open Buildings 2.5D Temporal predictions. A difference-in-discontinuities design compares pixels on either side of more than 800 boundary segments, following the boundary design of Harari and Wong’s work on Jakarta’s slum upgrading.

Building cover fell about 12 percent more inside the total-ban boundary, but the whole gap opened in 2019, the year of the destruction, and never widened. After the disaster, construction grew at the same rate on both sides of every announced boundary, including after the city adopted its spatial plan in 2021, and destroyed structures were rebuilt on neither side. Night lights show the destroyed flow sites going dark and staying dark. The legal zoning of 2021 and 2023 restricted a small fraction of the announced area, and its texts name the main liquefaction sites among the protected zones. In Palu, policy followed the destruction rather than causing the retreat.

Event-study plot, 2016 to 2023. Coefficients for three zone boundaries are flat and near zero before 2018. After the 2018 earthquake the total-ban boundary drops to about minus 0.27 and stays there through 2023, while the housing-ban and placebo boundaries stay near zero.

Building cover inside each zone boundary relative to just outside, by year, with pixel and segment-by-year fixed effects and 95 percent intervals clustered by boundary segment. The total-ban gap opens in 2019 and does not widen afterwards: the destruction set the gap, and post-disaster construction grew at the same rate on both sides.

Forgetting the Ground? Disasters and the Location of New Construction within Indonesian Villages

Billy Tulungen  ·  In progress  ·  JEL: Q54, R14, R52, O18

Do earthquakes and floods change where new buildings go within the villages they hit, and if so, for how long? I split each of about 72,700 Indonesian villages into hazard zones (flood-prone land, steep slopes, and soft soils) and the remaining land, and track new construction in each zone with satellite settlement data. Because the comparison is within the same village and year, destruction, reconstruction funds, and income losses that affect the whole village cancel out; what remains is whether new construction moves toward or away from hazardous land after a disaster.

The first fact is that new construction has been moving toward hazard zones. Flood zones hold 10.2 percent of village land and held 7.9 percent of the built-up stock in 1985, but received 10.9 percent of the settlement area added between 1990 and 2015. Steep slopes hold 27 percent of land but only 0.9 percent of the 1985 stock, and their share of new settlement area rose from under 1 percent in the early 1990s to about 3 percent by 2015. Two independent satellite products show the same path. Estimates of how individual disasters shift this pattern are in progress.

Line and marker plot, 1990 to 2020. The share of new built-up area in flood zones rises from about 8 to 10 percent in the early 1990s to 11 to 12 percent after 2000 in the annual WSF series, and GHSL five-year points rise from about 8 to 11.5 percent. The share on steep slopes rises from under 1 percent in 1990 to about 3 percent in 2015 in both series, and GHSL shows about 6.7 percent in 2020.

Share of new built-up area located in hazard zones, Indonesia. Lines: annual settlement area first built in each year (World Settlement Footprint Evolution). Markers: five-year increase in built-up surface (Global Human Settlement Layer). Both series show new construction shifting toward flood zones and steep slopes.

Roads Not Taken? Toll Roads, Market Access, and Village Economies in Java and Sumatra

Billy Tulungen  ·  In progress  ·  JEL: O18, R11, R12, R42, H54

Did the villages whose access to markets improved with Indonesia’s new toll roads become more economically active? Between 2015 and 2024 Indonesia opened more than 2,000 kilometres of toll road in Java and Sumatra. I compute annual market access for 47,575 villages on a digitised road network and face a problem common to market-access designs: villages near large cities and on natural corridors gain from almost any new road, so they are not comparable with villages elsewhere. Following Borusyak and Hull’s recentering approach, I simulate counterfactual opening schedules that reshuffle opening years among the sections actually built within each corridor, and use only the difference between a village’s actual and expected market access.

That correction matters. The raw association between night lights and market access (an elasticity of 1.39) falls to 0.17 once expected market access is taken into account, and the recentered estimate is negative and imprecise. Built-up area rises, and villages that gain a toll gate nearby brighten after opening, although that local estimate is not yet robust.

Two panels. Panel A, lines from 2014 to 2024: actual mean change in log market access rises to about 0.12; expected market access under the timing design follows it closely; expected market access under a design that also lets planned sections open rises to about 0.08. Panel B, bars: the cross-village spread of recentered market access is between about 0.012 and 0.023 in 2015 to 2023 and zero in 2014 and 2024.

Actual and expected market access. Panel A compares the mean gain in log market access since 2014 with its expectation over counterfactual opening schedules: most of the actual gain is predictable from where villages sit in the network. Panel B shows the variation left after recentering, which comes only from when sections opened.

Publications

Kompetisi dan Efisiensi pada Pengadaan Pemerintah: Bukti Empiris pada Kementerian/Lembaga di Indonesia

with Vid Adrison  ·  Indonesian Treasury Review, 6(1), 19–29, 2021

Does competition make government procurement cheaper? Using more than 82,000 procurement records from Indonesian line ministries and agencies, we find that each additional bidder lowers the winning bid by about 3.35 percent of the official cost estimate.

Grants

2026–2027

PhD Research Grant, ReCIPE Programme

“Crack Beneath and Between: Earthquakes and Communal Conflict in Indonesia’s Seismic Zone.” Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).

Dissertation

Shaking Land and Shaking Lives: Essays on the Economic Impacts of Seismic Disasters. Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia. Expected completion February 2028. Supervisor: M. Halley Yudhistira, Ph.D. Co-supervisor: Jahen F. Rezki, Ph.D.

The dissertation asks how large, plausibly exogenous physical shocks propagate through village-level social and economic life in a setting where formal insurance is thin and local order is largely self-enforced. The first chapter turns from the shock to the policy response, using satellite building data to study the no-build zones drawn after the 2018 Palu disaster. The second and third chapters share a common empirical infrastructure: a long village panel harmonised onto constant 2005 boundaries, and earthquake exposure constructed from USGS ShakeMap intensity surfaces.

Chapter 1

Lines Drawn after the Ground Moved

Post-disaster no-build zones and reconstruction in Palu, Indonesia. First full draft, in progress.

Chapter 2

Earthquakes and Communal Conflict

Village-level evidence from Indonesia, with M. Halley Yudhistira and Jahen F. Rezki. Draft complete; household mechanism in progress.

Chapter 3

Faith after the Shock

Earthquakes, religious expenditure, and the insurance value of religion. In progress.

Data and code

I am committed to reproducible empirical work. Replication packages for the dissertation chapters will be posted here as each paper is released: cleaning code, analysis do-files, and the village boundary crosswalk used to harmonise PODES waves onto constant 2005 boundaries.